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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
AMERICAN COAL CO.,
EMERY MINING CORP. ,
and STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Plaintiff/appellant,

Case No. 19134

vs.
TERRY W. SANDSTROM,
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, and SECOND INJURY FUND,
Defendant/respondent.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs seek review of an Order of the Inctustrial
Commission of Utah awarding Worker's Compensation benefits to Mr.
Terry W. Sandstrom, but refusing plaintiff's request for reimbursement
from the Second Injury Fund of the Industrial CoJTUnission.
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
An initial hearing was held before Administrative Law
i,,c]qp

Richard G. Sumsion at 1:00 p.m. on the 11th day of January,
Al

1

1

,,.,1,

that time the parties, Terry Sandstrom, The State Insurance

1ncl the Second Injury Fune', entered into a stipulated compensation
stipulating to a 20 96 oermanent partial disability,

10\

from a pre-existing condition and 10% from an accident incurred

-1-

While Sandstrom was in the employ of the nlaintif f
On January 21,

1983,

in this case.

the Administrative Law ,Judqe, Richi'!rd r,_ ,c,cr

entered his Findings of Fact, Cone 1 us inns nf La1v an,·] Order in

tl,c

On January 31, 1983, plaintiffs herein filed a Motion for Review
challenging the Administrative Law ,Judge's failure to award contc;.
to the State Insurance Fund from the Second In-jury Funn for medici'
expenses and temporary total compensation paid.

On March lR, 198;,

the Industrial Commission denied plaintiff's Motion for Review.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs are requesting that the portion of the Order
the Industrial Commission denying plaintiffs recovery from the Sec-:·
Injury Fund for 50% of the temporary total disability
and 50% of the medical expenses paid during total temporary
be vacated and the case remanded to the Inclustrial Commission.

.\ .,

Order of the Commission should be entered qranting olaintiff
bursement from the Second Injury Fund of 50% of total temporary
disability compensation paid and 50% of the medical expenses that
the State Insurance Fund has paid to the applicant herein.
FACTS
Mr. Terry W.

Sandstrom,

the applicant herein, sustained

personal injury in four separate accidents arising out of or in t'.e
course of his employment.
follows:

November 21,

November 23, 1981.

(R.

The dates of these accidents are as

lg77, May 4,

1979, December 17, 1980, and

at 39)

At the time of the January 21,

1977 ciccident and t-he

19 79 accident, Sandstrom was employed by American Coal

f'Ol'lP•W'

1980, applicant was employed by Emery r1ininq Corooration and
November of 1981 he was employed by Gusco,

-2-

Inc.,

(r. cit

)O) ·

in

As a result of these accidents, applicant has suffered
' total overall impairment of 20% permanent partial disability of
•he whole man to his back and 10% permanent partial disability of

th<

whole man to his neck.

(R. at 39).

The injury to plaintiff's

back is the subject matter of this appeal.

The State Insurance Fund

and the Second Injury Fund have stipulated that 10% of permanent
partial disability to the back results from the 1981 accident and
10% is attributable to the 1977 accident.

(R.

at 39, 43).

ISSUE ON APPEAL
Is the State Insurance Fund entitled to reimbursement
for 50% of the temporary total disability compensation and medical
expenses which it has paid the applicant as a result of the November
23, 1981, injury to his lower back?
ARGUMENT
IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE OF ENCOURAGING
EMPLOYERS TO HIRE HANDICAPPED PERSONS, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 35-1-69,
MUST BE INTERPRETED AS MANDATING THAT THE SECOND INJURY FUND
REIMBURSE THE EMPLOYER OR ITS INSURANCE CARRIER FOR A SHARE OF
MEDICAL EXPENSES AND TOTAL TEMPORARY DISABILITY COMPENSATION EQUAL
TO THE PERCENTAGE OF PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY ATTRIBUTABLE TO
ANY PRE-EXISTING MEDICAL CONDITION.
This Court's pre-1981 interpretation of Section 35-1-69,
allowing contribution from the Second Injury Fund for all types of
Worker's Compensation claims, is still applicable since the relevant
language of that statute remains basically the same.
States Steel Corp., 551 P.2d 504

McPhie v. United

(Utah 1976); Intermountain Health

'arc Inc. v. Ortega, 562 P.2d 617 (Utah 1977);

White v. Industrial

604 P.2d 478 (Utah 1979); Intermountain Smelting Corp.
__ 'c\Jpi tano,

610 P. 2d 334

(Utah 1980).

-

3 -

Furthermore, this Court's interpretation of Section
subsequent to the 1981 amendments thereof,
Court's interpretation
Hospital, 656 P.2d 410
Co.

v.

has not changed.
(Utah 1982);

)'i-1-69,

demonstrates that
Paoli v.

Cottonwoorl

Unites States Fidelity

Industrial Commission of

647 P.2rl 754

In Intermountain Health Care,

Inc.

& r, 11 iir.

(Utah 1983).

v. Ortega,

562 P.2d

r:

(Utah 1977), this court held that 35-1-69 required proportionate
contribution from the special fund

(now the Second Iniury Fund)

compensation and medical benefits in cases involving pre-existinq
injuries.

In Intermountain Health Care, the Commission found that

claimant had a permanent partial disability of 30%,

10% attributat.

to her pre-existing psychological condition and 20% attributable '·
accident which occured while on the job.
however,

The Commission failed,

to require the Special Fund to pay its proportionate share

of medical expenses.

This Court found that 35-1-69 required the

Commission to pay one -third of the medical expenses and compensat.:·
because one-third of the employee's permanent partial disability,. .. '
In the instant case,

attributable to her pre-existing condition.

parties stipulated that 50% of Sandstrom' s disability is due to a
pre-existing injury.

Therefore,

under the holding of Intermounta1r

Health Care, the Second Injury Fund should reimburse the State !rs.:·
Fund for 50% of the medical expenses and temporary total Cl.isabi'.tr
This Court extended

compensation that it has paid to Sandstrom.
holding in Intermountain Health Care,
disability compensation,
of Utah,

604 P.2d 478

to cover temporary total

in the case of White v.

(Utah 1979).

In 1-Vhi te,

several cases, each of which depended upon
§

35-1-69.

Industrial Col'U",'_:.

the court consul iJJ'

judicial constructi'"'

In each case this Court held that "he Seccond Tn1uc· r:

-4-

must reimburse the insurance carrier for the proportion of medical
''xpenses and temporary total disability compensation equal to the
'"- rcen tage of permanent partial disability applicable to the pre<°X l

sting injury.

Though § 35-1-69 has since been amended, the

language upon which this court relied in both White
Intermountain Health Care

and

remains basically the same.

That language,

as quoted in White, follows:

Id.

If any employee who has previously incurred a
permanent incapacity by accident or injury,
disease, or congenital causes, sustains an
industrial injury for which compensation and
medical care is provided by this title that
results in permanent incapacity which is
substantially greater than he would have
incurred if he had not had the pre-existing
incapacity, compensation and medical care,
which medical care and other related items are
outlined in § 35-1-81, shall be awarded on
the basis of the combined injuries, but the
liability of the employer for such compensation
and medical care shall be for the industrial
injury only and the remainder shall be paid out
of the special fund provided for in §35-1-68 (1)
hereinafter referred to as the "special fund".

at 479.

That language, even after the amendments, remains
basically the same:

!_·1

-.!h

C•JdC'

35-1-69.
Combined injuries resulting in permanent
incapacity - Payment out of second injury fund - Training
of employee. (1)
If any employee who has previously
incurred a permanent incapacity by accidental injury,
disease, or congenital causes, sustains an industrial
injury for which either compensation o!'ld or medical
care, or both is provided by this title that results
in permanent incapacity which is substantially greater
than he would have incurred if he had not had the
pre-existing incapacity, or which aggravates or is
agravated by such pre-existing incapacity, compensation
o!'ld medical care, wh±eh med±ea± eore and other related
items ore as outlined in Section 35-1-81, shall be
awarded
basis of the combined injuries, but the
liability of the employer for such compensation o!'ld
medical care, and other related items shall be for the
industrial injury only and the remainder shall be paid out
of the
second injury fund provided for in
Section 35-1-68 (1) here±!'lafter referred to
the
fti!'ld".
i\nn. §35-1-69 (SU\)!J. 1981).

Both versions of the statute provide that t!iP •'MPloypr shall he
responsible for the industrial injury only and that the remaind•
shall be paid out of the Second Injury Fund.

Tn

the instant c 2 ,

requiring the State Insurance Fund to pay 100% of the temporary
total disability compensation and the medical expenses incurred
is requiring the State Insurance Fund to incur liability for
than just the industrial injury.
Essentially, the State Insurance Fund is beina require'.
to pay for the medical expenses and total temporary disability
compensation attributable to the employee's pre-existinq
as well as those attributable to the industrial injury.

Such a

requirement clearly discourages the hiring of handicapped
since medical expenses for such persons are likely to be larger
and the period of temporary total disability longer than for
injured employees not suffering from pre-existing Medical conditu·
Discouraging employers from hiring handicapped workers defeats
legislative purpose of

§

35-1-69.

In Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano, 610 P.2d
334

(Utah 1980), this Court again held that the Commission erred

in ordering the employer to pay all medical comoensation and
temporary total disability benefits when a portion of the disabil
was attributable to a pre-existing injury.
§

Again, the language o:

35-1-69 upon which the Court relies remains basically the sam.

Discussing the language, the Court stated:
We think that the reasonable conclusion to be drawn
therefrom is that the employer is resrons1ble
for only the percentage of compensation and
medical care which the injury occurring in the
employment bears to the appli;ant's total
disabilitv.
This conclusion is also born out
by the final provision that anv amount which has
been paid by the employer in excess of the portion

-r,-

rd.

ot

attributable to said industrial injury shall be
reimbursed to him out of the special fund.
(Emphasis added)

337.

In 1981 the Legislature added two paragraphs to § 35-1-69.
The Second Injury Fund, apparently, relies on the second paragraph
to argue that the Second Injury Fund is not liable for its
oroportionate share of temporary total disability compensation
3nd medical expenses paid out.

That paragraph is as follows:

Where the payment of temporary disability benefits,
medical expenses, or other related items are required
as a result of the industrial injury subject to this
section, the employer or its insurance carrier shall
be responsible for all such temporary benefits,
medical care, or other related items up to the end of
the period of temporary total disability resulting
from the industrial injury.
Any allocation of disability,
benefits, medical care, or other related items following
such a period shall be made between the employer or
its insurer and the second injury fund as provided for
herein, and any payments made by the employer and its
insurance carrier in excess of its proportionate share
shall be recoverable.at the time of the award for
combined disabilities if any is made hereunder.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-69 (Supp. 1981).
The only logical reading of that paragraph, the only reading which
preserves the legislative purpose of 35-1-69, is that the
employer or its insurance carrier shall pay benefits and expenses
during the period of temporary total disability compensation and
then shall be reimbursed from the Second Injury Fund after the
stabilization date when determination of the percentage of permanent
partial disability attributable to each accident can be made.
in that paragraph, ".
:1rr1er shall be responsible .

The

the employer or it's insurance
", requires that interpretation.

r1,,_. Leqislature has purposely used the word "responsible" and not
t lie

word "liable", which indicates that the purpose of adding this

pardqraph was to clarify the administrative orocess by which the

-7-

employee would be paid.

This para<Jr3ph simplifies thilt rrc>c"'?rlur•

by mandating that the employer or insurilnce compilny pay ,,11 hcnPf,,
to the employee anct that allocations he marle afterwords in orrlPr
avoid a denial of liability by the emrloyer to force thr• .ill'lrat"
issue before the Commission.

the statute cleurl

Furthermnre,

1

,1

that any allocations shall be made arter the Period of temporary .,.
disability and that any payment "made by the emoloyer or the insup"
carrier in excess of its proportionate shares shall be recoverablE.

The statute states:

"Any allocation of disability benefits, medica:

or other related items following such period shall be made between
employer or his insurer and the second iniury fund as Provided for
herein,

That statement provides thilt the allocation shal'

be made following the period of total temporary disability.

Aooar""

the Second Injury Fund, has misinterpreted that statement to reac' ":
the allocation wi 11 be made of benefits an ct medical care fol
period of temporary total disability compensation.

./

Further, that

sentence provides that allocation shall be made between the emol0
and the Second Injury Fund as "provided for herein".

The statute

provides that allocation shall be made according to the oroportior.L
share of disability attributable to the inctustrial iniury and

attributable to the pre-existing conrlition.

In this case, that a:·:·

would be 50% of the temporary total compensation anrl medical exoenscc
to be paid by the State Insurance Fund, and 50% to be paid by th•
Second Injury Fund.

the

Insurance Funrl is ent1•

to a reimbursement of 50% of the temporary total c1isability cornpc•....
and the medical expenses it has paid to the employee in this c•••
In Intermountain Smelting Corp,

this court re•.•ersed the Comrn1ss 1

order apportioning all medical expenses and temoorarv •otal

-s-

1

I

LO

the insurance carrier:

. the refusal to require contribution

from the special fund for temporary total disability and medical and
hospilal expenses, as discussed in this opinion, is reversed."

Id.

A recent decision by this Court, indicates that the
of § 35-1-69, even after the 1981 ammendments, still
re•ruires reimbursement by the Second Injury Fund for temporary total
disability compensation and medical expenses.
& Guaranty Co., v.
1983),

In United Stated Fidelity

Industrial Commission of Utah,

657 P.2d 764

this court interpretated § 35-1-69 as amended.

(Utah

Though that

case involved several statutes and a fairly complicated fact situation,
this court did discuss the implication and purpose of § 35-1-69:
Explicit statutory authority exists to apportion
compensation awards and medical costs between
employers and the Second Injury Fund, provided
pertinent conditions are met.
Basically, those
conditions are three in number: 1) Permanent
incapacity occassioned by accidental injury,
disease or congenital causes, followed by 2)
subsequent injury resulting in further permanent
incapacity which is 3) substantially greater than
that which would have been incurred if there had been
no pre-existing incapacity.
Those conditions
having been met, the liability of the employer is
assessed "on the basis of the percentage of permanent
physical impairment attributable to the industrial
injury only and the remainder shall be payable out
of the said special (second injury) fund."
(Emphasis added)
Id. at 767.
In the instant case, as in United States Fidelity, all three
conditions have been met to allow apportioninq of compensation
awards and medical costs between the State Insurance Fund and the
Second Injury Fund.
ct

Moreover, nowhere in the Court's discussion

35-1-69 has the word compensation been modified, in such a way,
,,, suggest that total temporary disability compensation is not

t0

be apportioned between the employer or the insurance carrier

and the Second Injury Fund.

Furthermore, it is clear from the Court's

-9-

discussion of this statute thcit meclicci l expenc·;Ps ar<>

tn

between the employer and its insurancP carrier an<l
Fund.

Finally,

rw

clpr"lr'

Seconcl In

the Court, 3qain, discussc'cl Lht' p1lrf'()'.)t'

\)f

§

Furthermore,
of .J.n l:>mployer trJ r'.?tain
an injured or disabled employee aftl•r an iniury without

Id.

the risk of further liability for payment of compensatirr
and medical expenses should ci subsequent injury occur,
seems wholly consistent with the recognized statutorv
purpose which is to encourage employers to hire disabled
persons.

CONCLUSION
The Industrial Commission's refusal to orcler the Seconc
Injury Fund to reimburse the State Insurance Fund for it's proportionate share of medical expenses ancl temporary total comnensat1·
rests on a faulty interpretation of Utah Code Ann.

§

35-1-69

(Supc.

1981) which tends to defeat the Legislative purpose of encouraqinn

employers to hire handicapped workers.

Therefore, plaintiffs

respectfully requests that this Court vacate that portion of the
Order of the Industrial Commission denving olaintiff's recovery
from the Second Injury Fund for 50% of the temporary total disab1:
compensation and 50% of the medical exoenses paicl Mr. Scindstrom due:
the period of total temporary disability.
DATED THIS

of July, 1983.
BLACK & MOORE

-

) (I -
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